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REINVIGORATING PLEADINGS
REBECCA LOVE KOuRust JORDAN M. SINGER* & NATALIE
KNOWLTON*
INTRODUCTION
Pleadings are the gateway to the American civil justice system.
When properly drafted, they frame the issues to be resolved and open the
door to the procedures that make complete and effective dispute resolu-
tion possible. To fulfill their potential, however, pleadings must provide
litigants with two types of access: the ability to get into court in the first
place, and the ability to participate meaningfully in the process until a
complete judicial resolution is reached.' Getting in the courthouse door is
a necessary step, but it is not sufficient; parties must be able to afford to
stay in the system long enough to narrow their disputed issues and collect
relevant evidence for presentation to a judge or jury.2
The framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were seeking to
balance these two forms of access in 1938. Reacting to longstanding
concerns that meritorious claims were being dismissed on procedural
technicalities, they fashioned a system in which initial access to the
courthouse would be virtually guaranteed. Pleadings, which for centuries
had been the primary means of narrowing disputed issues, were stripped
of that function entirely. In their place, parties needed only to provide a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en-
t Executive Director, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, Univer-
sity of Denver. The Institute is a national, nonpartisan organization dedicated to improving the
process and culture of the civil justice system. Additional information on the Institute's work can be
found at www.du.edu/legalinstitute.
t Director of Research, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System,
University of Denver. The authors would like to thank Michael Buchanan, Pam Gagel, and Corina
Gerety for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
* Research Analyst, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, Universi-
ty of Denver.
1. On the general point about multiple dimensions of access, see Dennis A. Kaufman, The
Tipping Point on the Scales of Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. REV. 347, 365-66 (2009).
2. Several commentators have noted that narrowing issues is one of the central objectives in
civil procedure. See Nat'l Comm'n Staff Paper, The Early Narrowing and Resolution of Issues, 48
ANTITRUST L.J. 1041, 1042 (1979) ("Clearly defined issues direct the efforts of counsel and guide
the court in ruling on ancillary questions such as the scope of discovery. By clarifying the areas of
agreement and disagreement the parties may be better able to assess their positions and this may in
turn promote rapid settlement or adjudication. Poorly defined issues create problems of delay and
unnecessarily diffused efforts."); see also Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80
IND. L.J. 727, 757 (2005) ("Without a mechanism for narrowing the issues in dispute, a legal system
and the disputants would strain under the weight of the nearly infinite number of potential griev-
ances and legal theories conceivably stemming from parties' interactions."); Sidney Post Simpson, A
Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 HARV. L. REV. 169, 172 (1939) (noting that early
issue-narrowing allows both the parties and the judge to channel their time and energy away from
identifying the dispute and toward resolving it).
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titled to relief."3 To compensate for the loss of issue narrowing at the
outset of a case, the framers championed discovery, judicial manage-
ment, and summary judgment as credible tools to help the parties collect
information and focus their dispute for trial.
The new system was innovative, and the theory behind it reasona-
ble. In hindsight, however, removing the issue-narrowing function from
pleadings has proven to be a serious mistake. Failing to focus issues from
the outset of litigation has encouraged parties to seek out discovery that
is both voluminous and only tangentially relevant to their dispute. In
many cases-particularly complex cases--discovery and motion practice
have become so expensive and burdensome that parties cannot afford
adequate trial preparation and instead are forced to settle cases regardless
of the merits.4 Complaints about the costs of discovery and motion prac-
tice-both in time and money-have grown louder and louder in the last
sixty years, reaching a crescendo in the past decade, when the cost of
exchanging electronically stored information ("ESI") developed the po-
tential to exceed the entire amount in controversy in a case.5
The relationship between the two forms of access is currently far
out of balance, and both plaintiffs and defendants are poorer for it. We
need a civil justice system that encourages the filing of meritorious
claims and one that allows those claims to be honed and resolved effi-
ciently. We need, in other words, a process that begins to narrow and
focus issues as soon as a legitimate claim is filed. The most effective way
to accomplish this goal is by reinvesting the pleading stage with the re-
sponsibility of narrowing issues, by requiring the parties to plead materi-
al facts that support their claims, counterclaims, and affirmative de-
fenses.
As we describe below, a move to fact-based pleading need not upset
the general structure and values of the existing pretrial process. It would
simply provide more information up front than is usually available under
the current pleading regime, allowing the parties and the court to better
focus discovery and motion practice on the issues that are truly in dis-
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
4. In a recent survey of the American College of Trial Lawyers, seventy-one percent of
respondents indicated their belief that counsel use discovery as a tool to force settlement. See AM.
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT & 2008 LITIGATION SURVEY OF THE FELLOWS OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS A-4 (2008),
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/Interim%2OReport%2OFinal%20for%2Owebl .pdf [hereinafter
ACTIIIAALS, INTERIM REPORT]. There is merit to these concerns. Judge Scheindlin, for example,
noted a case in which a party admitted in an e-mail to deliberately extending litigation in the hope of
achieving a high settlement. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in
Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 339 n.42 (2000) (citing
Karen Donovan, E-mails Helped Microsoft in Connecticut Victory, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1999, at Al).
5. Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-Shifting in ESI Discovery Disputes: A




pute. Under our proposed fact-based pleading system, motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim would be granted only if a party does not plead
any objectively reasonable fact to support an element of a claim. Motions
for a more definite statement would be the favored approach to handling
claims where facts were omitted or unclear, and amendment of claims
would still be allowed. Discovery would still be available to flesh out
evidence on disputed issues, albeit in a more focused manner. The plead-
ing of material facts, in other words, would not be designed to restrict
access to the courts; to the contrary, it would increase access by making
participation in civil litigation economically more feasible.
To flesh out our proposal, we begin in Part I by examining two per-
vasive myths about the relationship between pleading and court access.
The first myth holds that issue-narrowing need not take place at the
pleading stage, because other procedural tools-in particular, discovery,
judicial management, and summary judgment---can focus the issues in
dispute as efficiently and effectively as pleadings can. In fact the oppo-
site is true, at least in a significant number of civil cases. We describe the
problems associated with assigning the issue-narrowing task to discovery
and summary judgment, and chronicle more than sixty years of warnings
that the existing system does not meet its core objective of focusing the
parties' dispute. We then address the second myth, that fact-based plead-
ing is simply a mechanism for keeping cases out of court. As we explain,
the requirement to plead material facts can actually increase meritorious
filings by making the overall litigation process more focused and more
affordable.
In Part II we examine a number of state court systems (and two for-
eign common law jurisdictions) that require fact-based pleading, and find
that such pleading is embraced both as the most efficient and effective
means for the parties to narrow their dispute, and as a mechanism that is
entirely consistent with assuring full access for meritorious claims. We
also examine state court rules governing pre-suit discovery, a tool de-
signed to preserve initial court access in fact-based pleading jurisdictions
by allowing a putative plaintiff to seek limited discovery before the filing
of a lawsuit if she would otherwise be unable to plead sufficient facts in
her complaint.
Building upon the lessons learned from both federal and state sys-
tems, in Part Ell we set out our proposal that parties be required to plead
material facts sufficient to support each element of an asserted claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or affirmative defense. This proposal would
replace the current language of Federal Rule 8(a)(2), but is not intended
to overhaul the current federal rules regime. The dismissal of claims
would still be the exception rather than the rule, and courts would still be
encouraged to resolve confusion or inconsistency in pleadings wherever
possible by granting motions for a more definite statement or by allow-
ing the pleading party to amend his or her claims.
2010]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Our proposal is designed to be a starting point for discussion. A
lasting solution will require input from many different constituencies, no
doubt representing diverse points of view. We welcome that input; we do
not claim to have all the answers. The goal of this Article is to lay the
groundwork and convey the urgency of the matter. For a wide variety of
civil cases, the system of notice pleading, broad discovery, and summary
judgment practice is economically impractical and unsustainable. Fact-
based pleading may be the best hope for creating a system that truly pro-
vides a "just, speedy, and inexpensive' '6 process for resolving disputes.
I. Two MYTHS ABOUT ACCESS AND PLEADING
This Part examines two common misconceptions about access and
pleading: (1) that broad "notice" pleading is sufficient to ensure full
access to litigants because parties in every case have the ability to narrow
the issues efficiently through other procedural tools; and (2) that requir-
ing the pleading of facts shuts out some meritorious claims. Both of these
beliefs are largely unsupported myths. With respect to the first myth, for
more than fifty years judges, lawyers and commentators have pointed out
the inability of discovery and motion practice to narrow issues effective-
ly. Indeed, far from promoting efficient resolution of issues by the court,
discovery and motion practice have too often forced settlement because
costs and delays in the discovery process proved too burdensome for one
or more parties. Courts, too, have grown increasingly aware of the risks
that excessive and expensive discovery poses to meritorious claims and
defenses. The much-discussed recent Supreme Court cases Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly7 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal8 are only the latest manifesta-
tions of this concern.
Similarly pervasive but also devoid of any real support is the belief
that fact-based pleading will inhibit the filing of meritorious claims. Ad-
vocates of this belief point to so-called "heightened pleading" require-
ments that demand detailed pleadings for certain types of claims, and that
are designed mostly to prevent an influx of cases into the court system.
As we explain, however, "heightened pleading" is qualitatively different
from the fact-based pleading we propose, which is designed solely for
issue-narrowing purposes. Furthermore, in the rare case in which initial
court access might be hampered because relevant material facts are ex-
clusively in the possession of another, we endorse procedures to help
potential plaintiffs gain access to such facts before the case is filed.
These two myths have long interposed resistance to any serious
consideration of introducing fact-based pleading to assure better court
6. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
7. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
8. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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access for all litigants. Real world experience with existing pleading
standards, however, tells another story altogether.
A. The Difficulty of Narrowing Issues in a Notice Pleading Regime
According to the standard narrative, the Federal Rules' approach to
narrowing issues through discovery and summary judgment rather than
through pleadings was welcomed both before and after the Supreme
Court affirmed the process in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson.9 In fact
the story is much more complicated. From almost the very outset of the
Federal Rules regime in 1938, the removal of the issue-narrowing func-
tion from the pleading stage was met with skepticism and concern by
many in the judiciary and the bar. And far from settling the issue, the
Conley case simultaneously exacerbated confusion about what should be
expected of pleadings and generated anxiety that truly meritless cases
would wreak havoc before they could be removed from the system. For
more than half a century after Conley, judges and lawyers struggled to
develop effective ways to focus issues after the pleading stage. The Su-
preme Court's recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal represent only the
latest efforts to compensate for the loss of pleadings' pre-1938 role in
narrowing issues.
Initially, lawyers seemed to be on board with the approach taken by
the Federal Rules. One practicing attorney, writing a year into the new
rules, rather idyllically announced that in contrast to detailed pleadings
that had evolved under the previous code system, 10 there was a "better
way" to get information from an opposing party: "All you need [to] do is
to send around a series of relevant questions to your opponent for him to
answer, and he is expected to answer to the extent that the answers are
not privileged."11 The Supreme Court agreed, noting in 1947 that "[t]he
various instruments of discovery now serve... to narrow and clarify the
basic issues between the parties."' 2 One much later commentator re-
9. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
10. Code pleading was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century as a simplified and less
technical approach to the common law pleading that had been in use for centuries. Under the most
celebrated code, developed by David Dudley Field and first adopted in New York in 1848, the
plaintiff had to plead facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action "in ordinary and concise lan-
guage without repetition." See 1848 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 379, §§ 120(2), 128(2), 131; see also Stephen
N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Histori-
cal Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 933-34 (1987). Over time, however, code pleading ossi-
fied, and the precise form of acceptable pleadings became confused. See Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437
(1986); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1303, 1326-1334 (1942) (explaining the
technical differences between those facts that were required to be pleaded and those that were im-
permissible). One commentator has noted that the intent of the framers of the Federal Rules was "in
large part to restore" the original objectives of code pleading. See Fleming James, Jr., The Objective
and Function of the Complaint: Common Law-Codes-Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 899, 918
(1961).
11. Elmo Hunter, One Year of Our Federal Rules, 5 Mo. L. REV. 1, 8 (1940).
12. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
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marked that the new system had a "splendid simplicity"13---claims could
not be frustrated at the outset by technicalities, and the discovery and
summary judgment processes would sift out claims for which the law
was clear and the facts undisputed, leaving only real, material disputes
for trial.
14
Despite this general optimistic tone, however, many still struggled
with the transfer of the issue-na.rrowing function from pleadings to dis-
covery and summary judgment. Judge James Alger Fee, writing only ten
years after the rules were promulgated, was forced to conclude that:
[I]t is still not clear that the pleadings therein authorized, including
not only complaint and answer but also all motions, affidavits and
depositions, advise the court, lawyers and parties prior to trial what
questions are to be decided. If this be true, the ultimate objective of
all proceedings before trial is lost.
15
The former Chair of the Illinois Committee on Civil Practice and
Procedure was even less charitable, decrying in 1951 the "weasel word-
ing" of Rule 8 and advocating that pleadings "disclose the elements of
the claim or defense in sufficient detail to inform the opposing party of
the nature of the case which he is called upon to meet."
'i6
These voices were not alone. During the 1950s, entire courts at-
tempted to graft tighter pleading standards onto Rule 8 in order to restore
their traditional issue-narrowing function. In 1952, the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Conference adopted a resolution suggesting that Rule 8(a)(2) be
amended to require a pleading to "contain the facts constituting a cause
of action."1 7 In doing so, the court expressed its skepticism about the
ability of discovery alone to narrow the issues effectively before trial:
Evils flowing from this uncertainty as to the issues may be briefly
summarized: ... If counsel do not know what all the issues will be,
counsel by discovery process (interrogatories, depositions, inspection
of documents, requests for admissions) cannot protect against sur-
prise or inadequate preparation save by greatly expanding all discov-
ery to meet all possible issues. As remarked by Judge Fee: "There is
always the peril of an undisclosed issue, which may not arise until
tria. It is true the discovery procedures help, but, unless the adver-
13. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REv. 551, 554 (2002).
14. Id.
15. James Alger Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 48 COLuM. L. REv. 491,491 (1948).
16. Edward W. Cleary, The Uses of Pleading, 40 KY. L.J. 46, 56 & n.18 (1951).
17. Judicial Conference of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Claim or Cause of Action: A
Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule (8)(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13
F.R.D. 253,253 (1952).
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sary's case is known at the outset, there is difficulty in discoveringS • ,18
about what to inquire."
The same sentiment was brewing among several judges in the
Southern District of New York, who began a push to require greater spe-
cificity in antitrust complaints.19 Judge Archie Dawson, for example,
dismissed such an action in 1956, arguing that:
If a complaint contains nothing more than general allegations that de-
fendants have violated various provisions of the anti-trust laws com-
bined with a prayer for relief, such a pleading... "becomes a spring-
board from which the parties dive off into an almost bottomless sea
of interrogatories, depositions, and pre-trial proceedings on collateral
issues, most of which may have little relationship to the true issue in
the case."
20
These reactions did not sit well with Charles Clark, the chief archi-
tect of the Federal Rules. In 1957, Clark-by then a judge on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals-authored an opinion designed to put an end to
the Southern District's rebellion. In Nagler v. Admiral Corp.,2' Clark
rejected the notion of special pleading standards for antitrust cases, ar-
guing that "the federal rules contain no special exceptions" for certain
types of cases. 22 But the Nagler decision did little to quell dissent. At a
presentation in August 1958, Judge Dawson again blasted the broad
pleading standard of Rule 8(a), asserting that the "filing of a complaint in
federal court is, in effect, a license to the plaintiff to subject the defen-
dant to the expense and difficulties of extensive discovery proceed-
ings. 23 Judge Dawson pointed specifically to the 1951 Prettyman Report
on complex cases, in which the Judicial Conference concluded that un-
necessary delay, volume and expense in such cases were attributable in
part to the fact that "the complaint and answer cannot in most [such]
cases ... be relied upon as a means of framing the issues with sufficient
definiteness." 24 The judge bemoaned, "at both the bar and bench, there is
considerable perplexity as to the proper procedure for securing a defini-
tion of issues in this type of case.,
25
18. Id. at 255 (quoting Fee, supra note 15, at 495).
19. Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
YALE L.J. 914, 924 (1976).
20. Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(quoting New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206
(S.D.N.Y. 1954)); see also United Grocers' Co. v. Sau-Sea Foods, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Dublin Distribs., Inc. v. Edward & John Burke, Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
21. 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
22. Id. at 323.
23. Hon. Archie 0. Dawson, The Place of the Pleading in a Proper Definition of the Issues in
the "Big Case," in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON PROTRACTED CASES FOR UNITED STATES
JUDGES, 23 F.R.D. 319, 431 (1958).
24. Hon. Leon R. Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 66 (1951).
25. Dawson, supra note 23, at 432.
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It was in the midst of this debate that the Supreme Court decided
Conley v. Gibson,26 a case that cemented broad "notice" pleading as an
acceptable approach in the federal courts for the next half-century. 7 In
Conley, African-American railway workers in Texas brought suit against
their labor union, alleging that the union had failed in its duty as their
bargaining agent to protect them against workplace discrimination.28 The
union moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including lack
of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.29 The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.3° In a short opinion, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding first that jurisdiction was proper and then turning its attention to
the sufficiency of plaintiffs' allegations. 3 The Court found the allega-
tions sufficient under a broad reading of Rule 8, holding that "a com-
plaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it ap-
pears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
32
On its face, Conley's "no set of facts" standard did not appear to re-
quire the recitation of any facts at the pleading stage; it would be enough
that plaintiff could prove some set of facts prior to summary judgment or
trial that would support his claim. 33 But such a standard creates an im-
possibly circular relationship between pleadings and discovery. The
scope of discovery is determined by the pleadings; parties may obtain
non-privileged material "that is relevant to any party's claim or de-
fense.,34 "If a claimant can proceed to discovery without any legally
relevant allegations at all . . . the pleading sets no standard" whatsoever
for what constitutes relevant discovery. 35 Accordingly, under Conley, "an
opposing party and the court can ascertain the limits on what is being
sought in discovery only by ascertaining what is being sought in discov-
ery. 36
The problems associated with mere "notice" pleading are not con-
fined to the plaintiffs submissions. Unfortunately, answers and counter-
claims are equally unhelpful at narrowing disputed issues. In two recent
26. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
27. Id. at 47-48.
28. Id. at 42-43.
29. Id. at 43.
30. Id. at 43-44.
31. Id. at 44.
32. Id. at 45-46.
33. Put another way, dismissal under Rules 12(b)(6) would be proper only if discovery would
be moot from the outset, because no conceivable set of facts obtained through discovery could create
a viable claim. Id. at 47. One commentator has referred to this standard as a "loosey-goosey rule."
Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 1
(2008).
34. FaD. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).





surveys of litigators, only about one-fifth of respondents agreed with the
assertion, "In notice pleading, the answer to a complaint shapes and nar-
rows the issues. 37 In a third survey conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center, less than fifteen percent of plaintiffs' lawyers and less than ten
percent of defense lawyers indicated their belief that by the time the an-
swer was filed, "disputed issues central to the case were adequately nar-
rowed and framed for resolution. 38
With issues remaining unfocused after the submission of pleadings
by both plaintiffs and defendants, the impact on cost and delay in the
pretrial process has been manifest. With the potential scope of discovery
so wide open, neither discovery nor summary judgment has proven ca-
pable of handling the issue-narrowing task efficiently and the costs effec-
tively in every case. Instead, discovery today can be a brutally expensive
enterprise, exacerbated by advances in technology and transportation. In
the 1930s, the sum total of discovery in a federal case might have
amounted to a few interrogatory responses, a file folder (or perhaps a
bankers' box) of documents, and one or two local depositions. There
were no word processors, cell phones, e-mail accounts, voice messages,
or computers. 39 Even if they had wanted to, parties could not have sought
out much information; there simply was not that much available, and it
was difficult to track down. By contrast, today ninety-nine percent of
information generated is electronic,4° and most of it is stored in a way
that makes it accessible to those who truly demand it. Law firms have
grown to a national scale,41 and depositions are taken anywhere in the
world. For many lawyers and potential parties, an astonishing amount of
information is technically available, but the cost of completing discovery
and moving to summary judgment or trial is simply prohibitive. Far from
actually narrowing issues, the discovery process may prevent parties
from ever getting to the facts that lie at the heart of their dispute.42
37. ACTIJlAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-3 (noting that only twenty-one per-
cent of respondents were in agreement); AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER
SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: FULL REPORT 50 & tbl.4.1 (2009)
http://www.abanet.org/litigationlsurvey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf (finding less than twenty-two
precent of respondents in agreement).
38. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 47 fig.22 (2009),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurvl .pdf/$file/dissurvI .pdf.
39. Richard Marcus provides a good litany of technological advances that are taken for
granted today but were unimaginable in the 1930s-including perhaps most importantly the photo-
copier. See Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
40. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A
VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-
FrontLines.pdf.
41. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REv. 873, 896-97 (2009).
42. See ACTIJIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-l, A-6 (noting that in a survey of
over 1,500 experienced plaintiff and defense counsel, eighty-one percent reported that their firms
turn away cases when it is not cost-effective to handle them).
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And this is when the discovery rules are followed. Abuses of the
discovery process are well-documented, at least anecdotally. Excessive
requests, 43 refusal to respond to legitimate requests,44 overproduction of
irrelevant documents,' unnecessary depositions,46 "Rambo" tactics,47
and the like have all been identified as factors that may contribute to
additional cost and delay in the pretrial process.48 As one court pithily
noted, "The federal rules envision that discovery will be conducted by
skilled gentlemen of the bar, without wrangling and without the interven-
tion of the court. The vision is an unreal dream. 4 9 The consequence is
that much time, money and energy is expended in many cases without
adequate narrowing of issues.
Since the mid-1970s, rulemakers have focused on runaway discov-
ery, but usually without explicitly acknowledging its connection to loose
pleading standards.50 A frenzy of discovery rules were promulgated be-
tween 1980 and 2000, each designed to address the problems of expense
and abuse: over two decades, lawyers and judges were introduced to
mandatory pretrial conferences, 5 1 proportionality limitations, 52 presump-
tive limits on interrogatories53 and depositions,54 sanctions, 55 and initial
disclosures.5 6 Yet complaints about the discovery process are as perva-
43. See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008)
(explaining that "one of the most prevalent of all discovery abuses [is] kneejerk discovery requests
served without consideration of cost or burden to the responding party").
44. See, e.g., Exact Software N. Am., Inc. v. Infocon, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 702, 703 (N.D.
Ohio 2006).
45. W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 61 (1999).
46. David Bamhizer, Princes of Darkness and Angels of Light: The Soul of the American
Lawyer, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 371,407 (2000).
47. Eugene A. Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's Creed: A Mandate for Professio-
nalism, 10 REv. LITIG. 673, 675 (1991) (describing "Rambo" litigators as those who practice "un-
professional courtroom conduct" that "drive[s] the price of competent legal assistance beyond the
means of middle America").
48. E.g., Lisa J. Trembly, Mandatory Disclosure: A Historical Review of the Adoption of Rule
26 and an Examination of the Events that Have Transpired Since Its Adoption, 21 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 425, 430 (1997) ("Discovery is sometimes used as a weapon against the opposing party to
discourage the adversary from pursuing his claim, to exhaust him financially, or to force him into a
settlement.").
49. Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
551, 553 (SD.N.Y. 1972).
50. One notable exception is the rule governing the scope of discovery. Several prominent
attorneys' groups pushed rulemakers to narrow discovery's scope to that which is relevant to the
claims or issues presented by the pleadings. See Section of Litig. Am. Bar Ass'n, Second Report of
the Special Committee For the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, app. at 158 (1980); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV.
529, 557-58 (2001) (discussing a proposal by the American College of Trial Lawyers). Twenty-
three years after the ABA's initial proposal in 1977, rulemakers changed the scope to allow discov-
ery "that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).








sive as ever.57 Discovery is simply not equipped to narrow issues effi-
ciently in many cases, especially when the pleadings fail to provide a
meaningful foundation to frame the issues in dispute.
Summary judgment, too, was originally extolled by the rule framers
as an efficient tool for narrowing claims prior to trial. Judge Clark ex-
pressed his view that the summary judgment procedure was "an impor-
tant and necessary part of the series of devices designed for the swift
uncovering of the merits and either their effective immediate disposition
or their advancement toward prompt resolution by trial ''58 In twenty-first
century litigation, however, summary judgment is not a particularly effi-
cient or cost-effective way to separate the strong claims from the weak.5 9
First, as noted above, the process of collecting sufficient informa-
tion through discovery to ascertain the strength of a claim can be very
expensive-sometimes prohibitively so. The additional cost (in time and
money) of preparing a summary judgment motion may also factor into a
party's calculations about how far to extend litigation. Furthermore, even
if the relevant information could be gathered, sorted, and presented to the
judge without transaction costs, there is no guarantee that a judge's rul-
ing will sufficiently narrow and clarify the remaining issues.
6
0
Summary judgment also comes too late in the pretrial process to be
an effective mechanism to narrow issues in many cases. In a recent study
of nearly 7,700 federal civil cases in eight federal courts, the mean time
to rule on a summary judgment motion after it was filed was more than
five months. 61 For complex cases-the cases most in need of issue-
narrowing-the mean time to rule on summary judgment was even long-
er: 273 days in antitrust cases, 234 days in environmental cases, 222 days
in securities cases, and 206 days in trademark cases.62 When the three to
six months that typically elapse before the start of discovery and the six
to nine months of actual discovery are tacked onto this time, an ordinary
litigant in a complex case faces eighteen to twenty-four months in litiga-
tion before summary judgment is decided. This reality hardly comports
57. See, e.g., ACTLJIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-4 (finding that less than
forty-four percent of respondents thought current discovery mechanisms work well, and only thirty-
four percent of respondents thought that the cumulative effect of changes to the discovery rules since
1976 has significantly reduced discovery abuse).
58. Charles E. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REv. 567, 579 (1952).
59. See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 306, 320 (1986) (noting that "in general the combination of discovery and summary judgment
has proved inadequate to narrow the issues in litigation prior to trial."); Jonathan T. Molot, How
Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REv. 955, 992
(1998).
60. Indeed, there is not even the guarantee that all judges will apply the "reasonable jury"
standard for dismissal of claims on summary judgment in the same manner. Suja A. Thomas, The
Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760 (2009).
61. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A 21ST CENTURY ANALYSIS 51 tbl. 11 (2009),
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/PACER%20FINAL%201-21-09.pdf.
62. Id. at app. D.
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with the "swift uncovering of. . . merits" and immediate disposition or
advancement that Judge Clark had hoped summary judgment would pro-
vide.
63
As it became increasingly clear that discovery and summary judg-
ment could not perform the issue-narrowing function that the framers of
the Federal Rules had intended-at least, not without significant transac-
tion costs-judicial pretrial management emerged as the strongest alter-
native. The original version of Rule 16 allowed the court to hold a more
or less informal conference at the close of pleadings in order to set out a
pretrial memorandum to govern the future course of action.64 With the
1983 amendments to Rules 16 and 26, however, judges were given ex-
panded discretion to restrict discovery and otherwise curtail lines of in-
quiry previously open to the parties.65 But case management has also
been critiqued as a suboptimal means of cutting away matters not central
to the dispute. Unlike motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment, whose results (and concomitant effect on narrowing the issues
on the case) ostensibly are tied to the merits of the claims, judicial man-
agement is by definition discretionary and effectively unappealable.
66
Moreover, even the most well-meaning judge faces a host of obstacles
when exercising his or her discretion, including imperfect information,
cognitive bias resulting from the use of heuristics to quickly process
complex information, and the judge's own (often unintended) role as a
strategic player in the litigation.
67
We do not mean to suggest that discovery, summary judgment, and
judicial management are not worthwhile pretrial tools; quite the opposite.
As compared to pleadings, however, they are simply overmatched in the
task of focusing the issues in dispute. Discovery is a costly way to extract
information, even when it works as intended. Summary judgment relies
on efficient discovery to itself be efficient, and judicial management is
most effective if the judge has a firm grasp of the salient issues in the
case from the outset. Fact-based pleading would not supplant these tools,
but would augment their collective capacity to move cases toward resolu-
tion more efficiently.
The tension between broad notice pleading on the one hand and the
inability of discovery, summary judgment, and judicial management
alone to narrow issues adequately on the other has been evident in a
63. Clark, supra note 58, at 579.
64. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (1938 adoption), reprinted in 3 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 16 app. 01 (3d ed. 2009); Simpson, supra note 2, at 193.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), 26(b)(2)(C); ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST
1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 34-36 (1984).
66. See Elliott, supra note 59, at 317.
67. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1986-2002 (2007).
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number of lower court cases issued in the five decades following the
Conley decision. The tone of each case is very similar: We recognize
what the Court said in Conley about "no set offacts," but .... This was
most clearly demonstrated in the Seventh Circuit's 1984 decision in Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.68 The plaintiffs in Car Carriers alleged,
among other things, that Ford violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act by conspiring to deny plaintiffs adequate published tariff rates for
their services, thereby making plaintiffs' businesses unprofitable.69 No-
where in the complaint, however, did plaintiffs allege-directly or infe-
rentially-the requisite element of anticompetitive effect.7° In upholding
the district court's dismissal of the claim, the Seventh Circuit expressly
acknowledged the "no set of facts" standard, but went on to conclude
that "Conley has never been interpreted literally. In practice, 'a complaint
... must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.' ' 71 The Court then expounded upon its concern that time-
consuming and expensive discovery should not be granted in cases that
were hopeless from the start: "When the requisite elements are lacking,
the costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing casel-
oad of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties into discov-
ery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can con-
struct a claim from the events related in the complaint."
72
The primary message of Car Carriers was clear: discovery cannot
possibly serve an issue-narrowing function if the parties cannot state,
even very broadly, what the factual and legal issues are at the pleading
stage. Other circuits wrestling with Conley reached the same conclusion.
In O'Brien v. DiGrazia,73 the First Circuit upheld the district court's
dismissal of a civil rights suit brought by police officers who refused to
supply their personal financial information to their employer, alleging
that the request violated their "right to privacy. a74 Seeing no allegations
that the plaintiffs' financial affairs would be broadcast to the public, or
even to other government agencies, the court concluded that Conley does
not impose "a duty on the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts that might
turn a frivolous claim of unconstitutional official action into a substantial
one." 75 Similarly, and based in part on the reasoning in O'Brien, the
Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a CERCLA claim in which plain-
68. 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984).
69. Id. at 1104-05.
70. See id. at 1109-10.
71. Id. at 1106 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan
Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984)).
72. Id.
73. 544 F.2d 543 (st Cir. 1976).
74. Id. at 545-47.
75. Id. at 546 n.3.
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tiffs had failed to allege in their complaints that they incurred "response
costs" as required by the statute.76
Even the Supreme Court appeared conflicted about how far it really
meant to go in Conley. On more than one occasion, the Court acknowl-
edged that the pleading of some specific facts would indeed be warranted
in some cases, particularly where the parties and the court otherwise an-
ticipated unfettered and cumbersome discovery. In Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpen-
ters,77 for example, the Court held that "a district court must retain the
power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a po-
tentially massive factual controversy to proceed. 78 The clear tension in
the Court's pleadings jurisprudence did not escape the attention of lower
courts; the Ninth Circuit has referred to the Supreme Court's subsequent
steps away from Conley as "unfortunately... conflicting guideposts. 79
This tension finally found (some) resolution in 2007, when the Su-
preme Court directly addressed the ramifications of the Conley rule in
Twombly, another antitrust action.80 The plaintiffs in Twombly brought a
putative consumer class action against regional phone monopolies-
known as "Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers" ("ILECs"), or more
colloquially, the "Baby Bells"-alleging a conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act to prevent upstart competitors from entering local tele-
phone and Internet service markets and to avoid competing with each
other in their respective markets.81 Specifically, the complaint alleged
that: (1) the ILECs "engaged in parallel conduct in their respective ser-
vice areas to inhibit the growth of [new competitors]"; and (2) the ILECs
refrained from competing with each other in their respective markets
despite "attractive business opportunities" to do so. 82 Ultimately, the
complaint alleged that:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in
one another's markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct
that each engaged in to prevent competition ... within their respec-
tive local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and
the other facts and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs al-
lege upon information and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a
76. McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1988).
77. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
78. Id. at 528 n.17; see also, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)
("We concede that ordinary pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.
But it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a
defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.
At the same time, allowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of the economic loss and prox-
imate cause that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about harm of the very sort the statutes seek to
avoid." (citation omitted)).
79. Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989).
80. Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
81. Id. at 550.
82. Id. at 550-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in
their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet services
markets and have agreed not to compete with one another and other-
wise allocated customers and markets to one another.
83
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the alle-
gations at most revealed knowing parallel business conduct, which did
not in itself violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.84 The district court
explained that "conscious parallelism" was not enough to form a con-
spiracy; read alone, the pleaded facts could be explained equally well as
"independent self-interested conduct." 85 Relying in part on Conley, the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that "to rule that allegations of parallel
anti-competitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a
court would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would per-
mit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was
the product of collusion rather than coincidence.
8 6
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that plead-
ing a section 1 claim "requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made." 87 In so holding,
the Court noted the growing criticism and confusion over Conley's "no
set of facts" standard, and concluded that "after puzzling the profession
for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. 88 The
Court further explained that "[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." 89
The reversal of Conley' s "no set of facts" standard did not occur in
a vacuum. Rather, Twombly demonstrated the Court's familiarity with
other courts' struggles to apply Conley in the antitrust context, and ac-
knowledged that it was troubled by the potential cost to litigate a case in
which the issues were undetermined and perhaps undeterminable. 90 Not-
ing the "costs of modem federal antitrust litigation, " 91 the Court explicit-
ly rejected both "careful case management" and "careful scrutiny of evi-
dence at the summary judgment stage" as stand-alone methods to prevent
83. Id. at 551 (first and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 544-45.
85. Id. at 552.
86. Id. at 553 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 425
F.3d 99, 114 (2005)).
87. Id. at 556.
88. Id. at 562-63.
89. Id. at 556.
90. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1231
(2008) (calling "the problem of costly discovery" the "first and most patent policy justification" for
the Court's approach in Twombly).
91. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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cost-conscious defendants from settling "even anemic cases" before
reaching the dispositive motion stage.92 The majority concluded that only
narrowing the issues at the pleading stage could prevent extraordinary
costs or settlement of non-meritorious suits:
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with "no reason-
ably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant
evidence" to support a § 1 claim.
93
The "plausibility" standard set forth in Twombly was reiterated in
the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. IqbaP4 two years later.
While the context was very different, once again the Court seemed moti-
vated in large part by issue-narrowing considerations. The plaintiff in
Iqbal was a Pakistani Muslim who had been arrested on criminal charges
and detained by federal officials in the wake of the September 11, 2001
attacks. 95 Iqbal filed a complaint against more than 50 known and un-
known federal officials and corrections officers, alleging unconstitutional
treatment while he was detained in a maximum security facility.96
Among the named defendants were then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
and then-FBI Director Robert Mueller, whom the plaintiff alleged ap-
proved a policy of holding post-September 11 detainees in highly restric-
tive conditions of confinement until they were cleared by the FBI.9 7 The
complaint further alleged that "knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject" Iqbal to allegedly harsh conditions "as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest."98
Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss for failure to state sufficient
allegations to show their involvement in clearly established unconstitu-
tional conduct.99 The district court denied the motion, and that decision
was upheld by the Second Circuit on interlocutory appeal. 1°° The Su-
preme Court disagreed, relying explicitly on its holding in Twombly (and
thereby putting to rest any belief that Twombly might be limited to its
facts).'0° Once again, the majority expressly rejected the notion that
"careful case management" would be a sufficient prophylactic to protect
92. Id. at 559.
93. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)).
94. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009).
95. Id. at 1942.
96. Id. at 1943-44.
97. Id. at 1944.
98. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1950-51, 1953.
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the named defendants from the temporal and monetary costs of discov-
ery:
We have held, however, that the question presented by a motion to
dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the
controls placed upon the discovery process.
Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is espe-
cially important in suits where Government-official defendants are
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust
of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the con-
cerns of litigation, including "avoidance of disruptive discovery."...
Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the
law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of val-
uable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the
proper execution of the work of Government....
It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petition-
ers can be deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other de-
fendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties
proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel
to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a
misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position.
Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders,
then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery. 102
In Twombly the motivating concern was the potential expense of
discovery in antitrust cases (echoing the admonitions of the Prettyman
report, Judge Dawson, and the Seventh Circuit in Car Carriers),0 3 while
in Iqbal the concern was the potential drain on human resources within
the federal government. 1°4 In both cases, however, the underlying appre-
hension was the same: discovery and judicial case management could not
meaningfully and efficiently focus the claims suggested by the com-
plaint. 105 Nothing, in other words, could adequately perform the issue-
narrowing function.
The holdings of Twombly and Iqbal have caused a sensation among
some members of the bar and the academy. Some see them as setting
forth an uncertain, confusing, or radical change in the pleading stan-
dard.1°6 Others have argued that Twombly and Iqbal represent only a
102. Id. at 1953 (citations omitted).
103. See supra notes 24, 72, 90 and accompanying text.
104. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
105. See generally Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1467799.
106. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 877, 889 (2008) (noting the "uncertainty of the Twombly holding");
A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (discussing
the "broad and confusing pronouncements of Twombly"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Plead-
ing, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 432 (2008) (describing Twombly as "a remarkable departure from estab-
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modest tweak of the pleading standard, a mere clarification that is entire-
ly consistent with previous understandings of Rule 8.107 From our pers-
pective, the degree of departure from prior caselaw-and even whether
the "plausibility" standard is the right one-is less important than the
unmistakable message of both cases that the issue-narrowing function of
current pretrial procedure is broken. The Court's announcement of a
"plausibility" standard for pleadings was an overt admission that the
long-held assumption that discovery could compensate for the loss of
issue-narrowing at the pleadings stage is simply not true for at least some
types of cases. Requiring some degree of fact-based pleading in support
of a party's claim or defense is merely a nod to the reality-anticipated
by several lower courts and at least twice by the Supreme Court it-
selfl 8 -that allowing discovery to proceed without a reasonable sense of
direction is simply irresponsible.
B. Courthouse Access and the Pleading of Facts
The second myth about pleading and access suggests that requiring
parties to plead material facts slams the door of the courthouse to merito-
rious claims. Such pleading requirements, the argument goes, effectively
create a heightened standard designed to prevent cases-particularly
cases alleging civil rights violations by government officials-from
going forward. But while access to the court for all meritorious claims is
a critical consideration, there is no reason to believe that merely requir-
ing the recitation of material facts at the pleading stage will prevent valid
cases from being filed or will lead to greater rates of dismissals. Indeed,
there is a competing argument that allowing issues to be narrowed earlier
in the litigation would streamline the litigation process, reduce cost, and
thereby allow a greater number of meritorious claims to be filed.
There is no particular inconsistency between the pleading of facts
and initial access to the courts. In fact, the framers of Rule 8 anticipated
that the parties would include salient facts in their pleadings. George
Donworth, an original Advisory Committee member, stressed that "the
requirement as to what a pleading shall contain does not by any means
imply that the facts are not to be stated."10 9 Charles Clark, too, observed
that "you would have to have at least some allegations of fact" in a
pleading under Rule 8.110 Indeed, the decision not to include the word
lished doctrine"); Andrde Sophia Blumstein, Twombly Gets Iqbal-ed, TENN. B.J., July 2009, at 23,
23.
107. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better:
The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 932 n.185
(2009) (arguing that Twombly is likely not "a major change to general standards of dismissal mo-
tions"); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manu-
script at 49-51), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1442786.
108. See supra text accompanying note 68.
109. Campbell, supra note 33, at 14.
110. Id.
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"facts" in Rule 8 seems to have been a matter of expediency rather than
rigorous opposition to a fact-based pleading regime. 1 "
Subsequent amendments to the Federal Rules strengthen the notion
that in most cases, the material facts necessary to support claims are
known or knowable before a claim is ever filed. Rule 11 (b) requires a
party to have factual and legal support for the allegations in his or her
pleadings,' 12 and Rule 26(a)(1) authorizes initial disclosures in part be-
cause the parties are expected to have available baseline facts necessary
to narrow issues from the outset of litigation."
13
Those who oppose fact-based pleading tend to respond that requir-
ing the parties to recite facts at the pleading stage will provide judges
looking for an easy way to shrink their dockets with an excuse to dismiss
cases. They point in particular to "heightened pleading" standards that
impose additional constraints on plaintiffs alleging employment discrim-
ination or other civil rights violations. 1 4 In the past, some lower courts
have indeed justified such "heightened pleading" standards as necessary
to limit "frivolous" cases, 115 but the Supreme Court has made clear that
such standards are impermissible. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Nar-
cotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,"t6 for example, the Court struck
down a Fifth Circuit requirement that in civil rights claims against gov-
ernment officials involving the likely defense of immunity," 7 the plain-
tiff s complaint must state "with factual detail and particularity the basis
for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official can-
111. Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5,12 (1938).
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b).
113. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer's E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36
N. KY. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (2009).
114. See, e.g., Nancy J. Bladich, The Revitalization of Notice Pleading in Civil Rights Cases,
45 MERCER L. REV. 839, 851 (1994); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45
ARIZ. L. REv. 987, 988 (2003); Fairman, supra note 13, at 551-52; Paul J. McArdle, A Short and
Plain Statement: The Significance ofLeatherman v. Tarrant County, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 19,
33-34 (1994).
115. The courts have been candid that docket control was the primary motivation for heigh-
tened pleading standards in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d
920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) ("In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of cases
brought under the Civil Rights Acts. A substantial number of these cases are frivolous or should be
litigated in the State courts; they all cause defendants[,] public officials, policemen and citizens
alike, considerable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It is an important public
policy to weed out the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and still
keep the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims." (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (D. Conn 1968))); Fairman, supra note 13, at
577-82 (collecting similar cases). The same motivation was at least partially behind the passage of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2003) ("The Reform Act was designed
to address a number of perceived abuses in these cases. In large part, its solution was to create a
series of procedural hurdles that make it more difficult for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring and maintain
nonmeritorious securities fraud class actions.").
116. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
117. See id. at 168-69.
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not successfully maintain the defense of immunity."'1 18 In so holding, the
Court noted that it was "impossible to square" the Fifth Circuit's rule
with "the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal
Rules."1 9 More recently, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,12° the Court
rejected the Second Circuit's imposition of a heightened pleading stan-
dard for employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 1 21 Again the
Court reiterated that a heightened pleading requirement conflicted with
the "simplified pleading standard" of Rule 8(a).
122
It would be a mistake, however, to conflate "heightened pleading"
designed to remove certain types of cases from court dockets with fact-
based pleading designed explicitly to deliver earlier narrowing of issues
for both parties. The former is motivated by a desire for gatekeeping; it is
designed to limit access to the civil justice system from the outset.
"Heightened pleading" also potentially hinders access by sometimes re-
quiring very particular facts to be pled in order to overcome an antic-
ipated affirmative defense (such as the immunity defense in Leather-
man).123 General fact-based pleading, by contrast, is not about docket
control. It views access to the courts as a question that extends through-
out the life of the case, from the initial filing of the complaint to the final
disposition of the matter. The claimant's true access to the court system
requires that valid claims be permitted at the outset, and also requires
that the claimant be able to follow the claim through until disposition on
the merits. In other words, fact-based pleading is premised on the belief
that the civil justice system should preserve economic access for merito-
rious claims at all phases of the case: filing, scrutiny of initial pleadings,
discovery, summary judgment, and trial. 124
Opponents of fact-based pleading also argue that it shuts out merito-
rious claims in cases-such as employment discrimination or Bivens
actions-in which the potential defendant has exclusive possession of
some or all of the key facts. 125 But procedural mechanisms already exist
to secure access to relevant facts for such claims. 126 In a number of states
118. Id. at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472,
1473 (1985)).
119. Id. at 168.
120. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
121. Id. at509,515.
122. Seeid. at513.
123. See, e.g., Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
124. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT 5-7 (2009),
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-IAALS%2OFinal%2OReport%2ORevised%204-15-
09.pdf.
125. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 892; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
126. For an extensive discussion of various state approaches, see generally Lonny Sheinkopf
Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217 (2007).
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(including Pennsylvania and Connecticut, which we discuss in more de-
tail in Part I), the courts may allow a putative plaintiff to seek limited
discovery on a matter before a case is formally initiated. 127 As long as
parties have meaningful ways to identify or confirm otherwise hidden
facts, a fact-based pleading standard should not inhibit initial access to
the courts.
In summary, opponents of fact-based pleading rely on two myths
about pleading and access that are simply not true. The most basic form
of access-merely getting into court and staying there past the pleading
stage-is not necessarily hindered by the requirement to plead material
facts supportive of a party's claims or defenses. By contrast, the more
extensive form of access-the ability to afford to see a case through to a
judicial resolution-is plainly hindered by a system in which issues are
not narrowed and focused at the pleading stage.
These lessons are evident from a review of the federal system. A
comparison to state and foreign jurisdictions, however, makes the point
even more powerfully. In Part II, we show how fact-based pleading has
evolved into a workable standard that supports both access and issue-
narrowing at the state level.
II. FACT-BASED PLEADING OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL RULES
Outside of the federal system, the benefits of fact-based pleading
have long been understood and are continually reaffirmed. A number of
state court systems in the United States have retained their longstanding
fact-based pleading requirements to motivate the early narrowing of is-
sues, even as they adopted other aspects of federal procedure. 128 Similar-
ly, many other common law countries have recently reaffirmed that the
pleading of facts from the outset of a case is indeed the fastest and most
cost-effective way to establish and focus the issues in dispute. A review
of these jurisdictions-both domestic and foreign-suggests that fact-
based pleading is beneficial, sensitive to and compatible with the need to
maintain full access to the court for meritorious claims.
We focus in this Part on state and international common law juris-
dictions129 in which fact-based pleading is considered to be consistent
127. See e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 3102(c) (McKinney 2009); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.48 (West 2009); PA. R. Cr. P. 4003.8.
128. John B. Oakley and Arthur F. Coon's seminal review of state court rules of civil proce-
dure identified 17 states that employ "some higher standard of factual specificity in pleading" than
the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules-Arkansas, Delaware, South Carolina, Florida,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska and New York. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules
in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1378
(1986). But see L.B. 876, 97th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2002) (overturning Nebraska's fact-pleading
standard in favor of the Federal Rules' notice pleading).
129. For the purposes of a more meaningful comparison, only common law jurisdictions will
be discussed; however, a number of civil law countries have been involved in civil justice review
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with-and often essential to-meaningful court access. We look first to
the many courts that have emphasized fact-based pleading's ability to
narrow issues efficiently. We then examine states in which special pro-
cedural tools have been developed in order to assure that the requirement
to plead facts does not inhibit the filing of meritorious lawsuits.
A. Appreciating the Role of Pleadings in Narrowing Issues
Several state and foreign courts have made abundantly clear that
pleadings play a central role in narrowing issues, and that this role cannot
be abdicated. As these courts have explained, fact-based pleading inures
to the benefit not only of judges and lawyers, but the parties themselves.
1. Oregon
The Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings contain
a "plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim
for relief without unnecessary repetition., 30 The Oregon Supreme Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed the state's commitment to fact pleading.131 In
Adams v. Oregon State Police,132 the Court addressed the sufficiency of
pleading notice under Oregon Statute 30.275 and noted that the "purpose
of requiring an exchange of pleadings is not to produce perfection in the
statement of the issue but only to bring forth into the light the points that
are in dispute."' 133 According to the Court, the pleadings have served this
function "[w]hen those points are sufficiently revealed so that the oppo-
nent is apprised of what he must meet and the trial judge is given suffi-
cient information so that he can rule advisedly during the progress of the
trial. 134 The Court reaffirmed the role of pleadings several years later in
and reform. In the last decade, substantial reviews have been undertaken in Spain, Germany, France
and the Netherlands. Furthermore, in these and most other civil law jurisdictions, parties are required
to comport with pleading standards far more strict than those characteristic of common law jurisdic-
tions; often requiring parties to plead facts and the proof on which the parties intend to rely to sup-
port these facts. PETER L. MURRAY & RoLF STRONER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 158 (2004) (citing
Zivilprozeoordnung [ZPO] [civil procedure statute] Jan. 30, 1877, § 139(2)). Amendment of the
pleadings in many civil law jurisdictions is also strict. In Spain, for example, once the respondent
files a response to a claim or counterclaim, the pleadings cannot be amended or modified. Ifigo
Quintana et al., Spain, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 677, 682 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 2003).
130. OR. R. Ctv. P. 18(A).
131. Throughout this Part I, we refer to "fact-based pleading" to designate the general concept
of introducing facts at the pleading stage in order to narrow and focus disputed issues. Most states
with such requirements, however, refer to the process as "fact pleading" in deference to the form of
pleading that originated with the 1848 Field Code and has been carried over to this day. Out of
respect for the traditional language, we use "fact pleading" when referring to specific state statutes
and rules.
132. 611 P.2d 1153 (1980).
133. Id. at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 383
P.2d 107, 113 (1963)).
134. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perkins, 383 P.2d at 113).
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Davis v. Tyee Industries, Inc. 135 -a case that some commentators believe
reached the Oregon Supreme Court solely for this purpose.
136
The benefits of fact pleading have also been affirmed by those who
practice in Oregon courts every day. In a recent survey undertaken by the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, members
of the Oregon State Bar endorsed fact-based pleading by large margins.
Among the findings:
* Fifty percent of respondents said fact pleading increased the effi-
ciency of the litigation process; only seventeen percent said it de-
creased efficiency. 1
37
0 Fifty-five percent of respondents said that fact pleading increased
counsel's ability to prepare for trial; only seven percent said it de-
creased that ability. 138
* Thirty-nine percent of respondents said that fact pleading in-
creased the fairness of the litigation process; only thirteen percent
said it decreased fairness. 139
* Sixty-four percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with
the statement, "Fact pleading helps narrow the issues early in the
case."
,140
Many comments to the open-ended sections of the survey also ex-
tolled the virtues of fact-based pleading. One respondent indicated a pre-
ference for Oregon state court over federal court because pleadings "ac-
tually mean something" in state court.'14 As one respondent noted, "Fact
pleading.., cleans up the process and makes the parties focus on what
the case is really about."
' 142
2. New Jersey
New Jersey courts have long recognized that, although the technical
and formal requirements for pleadings have been abandoned, the re-
quirement that parties plead facts and the primary role of pleadings in
narrowing issues have not. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held
that:
135. 668 P.2d 1186 (1983).
136. See Maurice J. Holland, Some Contributions of Justice Peterson to Oregon's Civil Proce-
dure, 73 OR. L. REV. 785, 811 (1994).
137. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SURVEY OF THE OREGON BENCH




141. Id. at 24.
142. Id.
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[T]he objective of reaching an issue of law or of fact in two or at the
most three simple pleadings has been attained, but not at the sacrifice
of stating the elements of a claim or of a defense. They remain the
same as at common law as a matter of substantive law as well as of
good pleading. 1
43
And while New Jersey's fact pleading standard-which requires "a
statement of the facts on which the claim is based"4-is to be liberally
construed, the New Jersey Superior Court has held that "a party's plead-
ings must nonetheless fairly apprise an adverse party of the claims and
issues to be raised at trial. 1 45 While New Jersey courts understand that
amendment of the pleadings to conform to new evidence should be liber-
ally permitted, this liberal practice
does not justify the pleading of mere conclusions without facts, fol-
lowed by reliance upon subsequent discovery (without a frame of
reference) to justify a lawsuit.
It is just inexcusable to plead merely a conclusion and thereafter
attempt to justify this action by an attempt to resort to the discovery
practice permitted by our rules. Such discovery is intended as an aid
to every litigant to avoid surprise and make a lawsuit an inquiry into
truth and justice. It is not (and was not intended) to be a substitute for
good pleading, a shield for the lazy pleader or a means of avoiding
the requirements of pleading legally sufficient facts.... Our discov-
ery practice is no more a cure to legally deficient pleadings than aspi-
rin is to cancer. 146
3. Florida
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure require "a short and plain
statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief." 147 Florida courts have held that this pleading rule "forces counsel to
recognize the elements of their cause of action and determine whether
they have or can develop the facts necessary to support it, which avoids a
great deal of wasted expense to the litigants and unnecessary judicial
effort."' 148 In Continental Banking Co. v. Vincent,149 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal found "cause for concern" where the lower court's rul-
ing on a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment took into
consideration federal district court rulings that were made prior to the
143. Grobart v. Soc'y for Establishing Useful Mfrs., 65 A.2d 833, 839 (N.J. 1949); see also
Gruccio v. Baxter, 343 A.2d 145, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (discussing Grobart).
144. N.J. CT. R. 4:5-2.
145. Miltz v. Borroughs-Shelving, a Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc., 497 A.2d 516, 519 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985).
146. Grobart, 65 A.2d at 835.
147. FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.110(b).




federal court's remand of the case to state court. 150 The Court noted that
the
quality of pleading that is acceptable in federal court and which will
routinely survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted will commonly not approach the mini-
mum pleading threshold required in our state courts.... The fact that
a pleading of a state law claim in a diversity case in federal court has
survived a motion to dismiss says nothing about whether the claim
meets the pleading standard required in our state courts.
151
The practical distinction, therefore, between the fact pleading re-
quirement in Florida state courts and notice pleading in federal court is
more than illusory. In Vincent, had the record not indicated that the mo-
tions were considered on their merits, it appears that the Fifth District
Court of Appeals would have reconsidered the lower court's ruling. 152
Furthermore, while Florida courts permit parties to amend the
pleadings to incorporate evidence that supports new causes of action,
parties are precluded from recovering under claims where they do not
plead a cause of action with sufficient particularity to narrow the issues
in dispute-or attempt to later prove a cause of action not pleaded or
insufficiently supported in the pleadings. To this effect, the Florida Su-
preme Court has held that "litigants at the outset of a suit must be com-
pelled to state their pleadings with sufficient particularly for a defense to
be prepared. Our growing, complex society and diminishing resources
mandate the requirement that litigants present all claims to the extent
possible, at one time, and one time only."'
' 53
4. Maryland
Despite a move in 1984 to rules that more closely resemble those of
their federal counterparts, Maryland state courts also remain loyal to fact
pleading.154 According to Modern Maryland Civil Procedure, the "reten-
tion of the trappings of code or fact pleading... quite probably indicates




153. Arky, Freed, Steams, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A. v. Bowmar Instrument
Corp., 537 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1988); see also Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So. 2d 169, 172-73 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reciting the language in Arky and Cont'l Banking Co. in reversing the trial
court's denial of the motion to dismiss on the basis that the third-party complaint did not state a
cause of action).
154. The 1984 revisions to the Maryland Rules were substantial. One of the major changes was
the merger of law and equity that eliminated many of the technical requirements of common-law
pleadings. Overall, the changes to the Maryland pleading rules resulted in a pleading system that
"embodies the spirit of federal pleading" but retained the requirement that parties plead facts. 1-2
Md. Rules Commentary (MB) § 300 (2009); see also MD. RULE 2-303 (2009) (requiring in plead-
ings "only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader's entitlement to relief or
ground of defense").
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•.. than in federal practice." 155 The Maryland Court of Appeals has held
as much, recognizing that notice to the parties as to the nature of the
claim or defense is the paramount role of pleadings, but nonetheless
pointing to three additional roles of pleadings: (1) to state the facts upon
which the claim or defense allegedly exists; (2) to define the boundaries
of litigation; and (3) to provide for the speedy resolution of frivolous
claims and defenses. 156 Further-as is the case in New Jersey, Oregon,
and Florida-in Maryland pleading facts provides not only notice to the
parties as to the nature of the claim or defense, it also provides notice as
to the precise facts that support the claim or defense, allowing parties to
focus their efforts when going forward with discovery.
5. The Recent Reaffirmation of Fact-Based Pleading in Other
Common Law Countries
Generally speaking, the world of pleadings outside the United
States is a world of fact-based pleading. Civil law jurisdictions are cha-
racterized by their strict pleading standards, often requiring parties to
plead facts and the proof on which the parties intend to rely to support
those facts. 157 Amendment of the pleadings in many civil law jurisdic-
tions is often not allowed.15 8 Common law jurisdictions outside of the
United States, while employing a considerably more relaxed pleading
standard than their civil law counterparts, nevertheless require parties to
plead facts.'
59
In the last fifteen years, several common law countries-among
them England, Canada, Australia and Hong Kong-have undertaken
comprehensive reviews of their civil justice systems, driven by concerns
about growing cost and delay, and a corresponding decrease in access to
the court system. 16 As part of their review, each of these jurisdictions
has taken a fresh look at the value of fact-based pleadings, and each has
reaffirmed the importance of pleading facts to narrow the issues in dis-
pute. We offer here illustrations from two common law systems most
similar to that of the United States: Canada and England.
a. Canada
A number of Canadian provinces-each having the authority to
promulgate its own rules of civil procedure-have been active in civil
155. 1-6 Modem Md. Civil Procedure (MB) § 6.1 (2009).
156. Scott v. Jenkins, 690 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Md. 1997).
157. See, e.g., MURRAY & STRONER, supra note 129, at 158.
158. In Spain, for example, once the respondent files a response to a claim or counterclaim, the
pleadings cannot be amended or modified. Quintana et al., supra note 129, at 682.
159. See, e.g., FED. CT. R. 11.2 (Austl.); ALTA. R. CT. 104 (Can. Alta.); ONT. R. Civ. P.
25.06(l) (Can. Ont.); CPR 16.4(l)(a) (U.K.).
160. For the purposes of a more meaningful comparison, only common law jurisdictions will
be discussed; however, a number of civil law countries have been involved in civil justice review




justice reform. The Alberta Rules of Court Project commenced in 2001,
with the goals of making the rules of civil procedure more clear, user-
friendly, and efficient. Pleadings were one of the major topics of review
and under consideration was whether Alberta's fact pleading standard
16'
should be retained or replaced by a standard similar to that in the U.S.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
62
The majority view that emerged from consultations with the Alberta
legal community163 was that detailed pleadings-the purpose of which is
to "define precisely the matters in dispute in an action"'---were valua-
ble enough to outweigh the initial costs associated with preparing, filing,
and exchanging them.' 65 The pleadings were thought to keep the parties
on track, and respondents voiced concern that relaxing formal pleading
requirements might increase the costs and delay associated with defining
the facts and issues in a case.1 66 Some respondents suggested that issues
should be more clearly defined in pleadings, 67 while others noted that
the filing of more detailed particulars (details specifying the nature of
certain alleged facts) would increase the efficiency of disclosure and
discovery.168 Respondents commenting on particulars also suggested
including an automatic right to receive better particulars or the ability to
serve a request on the opposing party for better particulars without the
need for a court order.
169
The Rules of Court Project ultimately rejected the proposition that
Alberta move to notice pleading,17 0 with the Project's General Rewrite
Committee concluding that a move to notice pleading would be "a move
in the wrong direction."'' 71 The Proposed Rules of Court, published in
October 2008 but yet to be approved by the legislature, require that
pleadings state "the facts on which a party relies," "a matter that defeats,
161. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, ALBERTA RULES OF COURT PROJECT: PLEADINGS,
CONSULTATION MEMORANDUM No. 12.8, at 1 (2003), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/cml2-
8.pdf [hereinafter ALRI] (referencing that the pleading standard in Alberta at the time the Project
commenced required a "statement in summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defence").
162. Id. at 1-6.
163. See ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, ISSUES PAPER FOR THE LEGAL COMMUNITY:
ALBERTA RULES OF COURT PROJECT 1 (2001), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/arcissue.pdf.
The Alberta Rules of Court Project circulated a short issues paper, inviting feedback on, among
other issues, the following two pleadings questions: "Do the cost and delay associated with formal
pleadings outweigh their value?" and "Should pleadings be abolished and replaced by a less formal
narrative of fact and law provided by each party?" Id. at 6.
164. Id. at5.
165. Id.
166. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, ALBERTA RULES OF COURT PROJECT: REPORT ON




170. ALRI, supra note 161, at 6.
171. Id.
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In the mid-1990s, a substantial review of the civil justice system in
England and Wales resulted in new rules that, while simplified, still re-
quire the pleading of facts. The English review, commissioned by the
Lord Chancellor and undertaken by one of England's most senior judges,
the Right Honorable Lord Woolf, identified a number of problems with
the English system of pleadings. The pleadings failed to set out the facts
and therefore impeded the identification of issues, were often long-
winded, and concentrated too much on causes of action and defenses. 173
In short, Lord Woolf concluded that "the basic function of pleadings-to
state succinctly the facts relied on-has been lost sight of."' 174 According-
ly, Lord Woolf s suggestions for reforming the pleading system were
centered on the need "to ensure that the basic function of pleadings-to
state facts-is restored to primacy."'
175
In formulating his recommendations for reform, Lord Woolf en-
gaged in an extensive review of rules and procedures in several foreign
common law jurisdictions by seeking in-person consultations with practi-
tioners and judges in these jurisdictions, including the United States.
176
Given the uniqueness of notice pleading to the U.S. system, Lord Woolf
was exposed to this alternative but nevertheless opted to retain fact-based
pleading, envisioning that the role of pleadings under the new rules
would enable the court and the parties to identify and define the issues in
dispute. 77 He recommended that a "claim"-synonymous with a com-
plaint in the U.S. civil justice system-should "set out a short description
of the claim and a succinct statement of the facts relied on.' ' 178 And a
defense should contain indications as to which parts the defendant ad-
mits, denies, doubts to be true or neither admits nor denies, insofar as
they differ from the version set forth by the claimant. 179 In large part,
172. ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, RULES OF COURT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT NO. 95
app. H (2008), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/1 .%20Appendix%20H%20-
%20Proposed%2ORules%20of%20Court.pdf.
173. RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES ch. 20, para. 4 (1995),
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interim/chap20.htm.
174. Id. (citation omitted).
175. Id. at ch. 20, para. 8.
176. See RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES annex H (1996),
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/annex1 &2.htm.
177. See id. at sec. II, ch. 9, para. 5.
178. Id. at ch. 12, para. 11.
179. Id. at para. 16.
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these recommendations were implemented into Part 16 of the 1998 Civil
Procedure Rules ("CPR").1
80
Although Lord Woolf s proposals, as implemented in the CPR, rad-
ically simplified the way in which parties commence an action,' 8' the
"Woolf Reforms" added certain procedural requirements that actually
increased the amount of factual information parties are required to set
forth in the period before discovery. A series of pre-action protocols in-
stituted procedural requirements with which parties must comply prior to
filing a claim in court. Included in these requirements is the exchange of
pleading-like documents called Letters of Claim that must set forth facts
on which the potential claim is based. 82 The specialized pre-action pro-
tocols identify particular facts and documents that must be exchanged;
1 83
claims not covered by a specialized protocol are subject to the Practice
Direction, which requires among other things that the Letter of Claim
contain "a clear summary of the facts on which the claim is based."' '84
B. Balancing Fact-Based Pleadings and Initial Court Access
State and international jurisdictions have not only affirmed their
commitment to fact-based pleading as a valuable tool for narrowing dis-
puted issues, but have also developed procedural mechanisms to ensure
that the pleading standard does not adversely impact initial access to the
courts. While these mechanisms vary, their purpose is the same: to ad-
dress those situations in which the facts necessary to meet the pleading
standard are in the hands of the opposing party. These mechanisms en-
sure access to the courts without sacrificing the requirements-and there-
180. Under Part 16.2(1)(a), the parties are required to file a claim form that contains "a concise
statement of the nature of the claim." CPR 16.2(l)(a) (U.K.). Under Part 16.4(l)(a), the claimant
must also provide the opposing party with the particulars of the claim, including "a concise state-
ment of the facts on which the claimant relies." Id. 16.4(i)(a). The Practice Direction supplement for
Part 16 directs that the particulars of claim can be included with the claim form, served alongside the
claim form, or served at a later date. Id. 16 PD paras. 3.1-.3. The Practice Direction further lists
additional particulars that parties must include, tailored to certain claim types. See id. paras. 4.1, 5.1,
6.1.
181. The complications in the English system of pleadings prior to the Woolf reforms arose
from the highly technical requirements of commencing a claim. For example, in the High Court
alone there were four methods of starting proceedings-writ, originating summons, originating
motion and petition in the High Court. A similar situation existed in the country courts, where pro-
ceedings could be commenced by summons, originating application, petition and notice of appeal.
Further complication existed in the varying forms of each method-for example, there were three
types of forms of originating summons. As each method of commencing proceedings had different
consequences, determining how to commence an action became very complicated. WOOLF, supra
note 176, at sec. MI, ch. 12, par. 1, http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec3b.htm#cl2.
182. See e.g., CPR Pre-action Protocol for Housing Disrepair Cases para. 3.3(a) (U.K.); id. Pre-
action Protocol for Disease and Illness para. 6.2; id. Pre-action Protocol for Judicial Review para.
10; id. Pre-action Protocol for the Resolution of Clinical Disputes para. 3.16.
183. See, e.g., id. Pre-Action Protocol for Housing Disrepair Cases paras. 3.2-5; id. Pre-
Action Protocol for Disease and Illness Claims paras. 4.1-5; id. Pre-Action Protocol for Resolution
of Clinical Disputes paras. 3.14-19; id. Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims paras. 3.2-
.20.
184. Id. Pre-action Conduct PD sec. IV, annex A, para. 2.1(3).
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fore the benefits-of a fact-based pleading standard. We briefly describe
how these processes work in three state courts.
1. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's pleading standard requires that parties plead the
"material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based... in a
concise and summary form."' 185 In numerous opinions Pennsylvania
courts have further established the importance of the pleadings in nar-
rowing the issues. In Smith v. Wagner, 86 the Superior Court held that a
sufficient complaint "must do more than give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. It
should formulate the issues by fully summarizing the material facts."'
187
In Miketic v. Baron, 88 the Superior Court held that "the pleader must
define the issues; every act or performance essential to that end must be
set forth in the complaint.'
189
Pennsylvania courts have been firm in their commitment to fact-
based pleading, and the Superior Court has held that parties cannot es-
cape their duties under this standard "by a general averment that the facts
are in the possession of the defendant."' 90 However, Pennsylvania civil
procedure recognizes that in limited situations the facts necessary to craft
a complaint may be exclusively in the hands of the defendant and, where
this is the case, a requirement that parties plead facts may prohibit plain-
tiffs from being able to bring a claim. 19' To protect a plaintiff's ability to
access the court in such situations, the Pennsylvania rules allow deposi-
tions or interrogatories "for preparation of pleadings" under certain cir-
cumstances. 192 "Pre-complaint discovery" is available to prospective
plaintiffs "where the information sought is material and necessary to the
filing of the complaint."193 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held
that "because of the need for specificity in pleading," the pre-complaint
discovery mechanism "play[s] a critically important role in Pennsylva-
nia's pleading scheme."'
194
Where a plaintiff is not in possession of the facts needed to craft a
complaint, he or she may commence the action by filing a writ of sum-
mons-in lieu of a complaint-and then seek pre-complaint discovery to
185. PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a).
186. 588 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
187. Id. at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baker v. Rangos, 324 A.2d 498,
505-06 (Pa. Super Ct. 1974)) (referencing Conley and the federal notice pleading standard).
188. 675 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
189. Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Santiago v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co., 613 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
190. Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Abbott Labs., 505 A.2d 973, 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
191. See PA. R. CIv. P. 4001 (c).
192. See id.
193. PA. R. CrY. P. 4003.8(a).
194. McNeil v. Jordan, 894 A.2d 1260, 1269 (Pa. 2006).
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obtain facts sufficient to support the complaint. 195 Trial courts have dis-
cretion as to whether to allow this form of early discovery, and they take
into consideration whether it will "cause unreasonable annoyance, em-
barrassment, oppression, burden or expense to any person or party."
196
Where opposed by the party from whom it is sought, the court may re-
quire the plaintiff "to state with particularity how the discovery will ma-
terially advance the preparation of the complaint" and "shall weigh the
importance of the discovery request against the burdens imposed on any
person or party from whom the discovery is sought."' 97 In McNeil v. Jor-
dan,198 the definitive case governing pre-complaint discovery, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court provided trial courts with the following guid-
ance when considering a plaintiffs request to obtain pre-complaint dis-
covery:
[A] litigant should be required to demonstrate his good faith as well
as probable cause that the information sought is both material and
necessary to the filing of a complaint in a pending action. A plaintiff
should describe with reasonable detail the materials sought, and state
with particularity probable cause for believing the information will
materially advance his pleading, as well as averring that, but for the
discovery request, he will be unable to formulate a legally sufficient
pleading. Under no circumstance should a plaintiff be allowed to em-
bark upon a "fishing expedition," or otherwise rely on an amorphous
discovery process to detect a cause of action he lacks probable cause
to anticipate prior to the pre-complaint discovery process under this
standard. 99
The standard that a plaintiff must meet to obtain pre-complaint dis-
200covery is a relatively strict one. In McNeil, the Court recognized that
the emergent consensus in Pennsylvania trial courts at the time of its
ruling was that "pre-complaint discovery should be restrictively allowed,
narrowly drafted, and permitted only when a complaint capable of sur-
viving preliminary objections cannot be filed without aid of the requested
discovery. '201 However, this standard is not impossible to meet where a
195. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1007.
196. Id. 4003.8(a).
197. Id. 4003.8(b).
198. 894 A.2d 1260.
199. Id. at 1278.
200. See e.g., Potts v. Consol. Rail Corp., 37 Pa. D. & C.4th 196, 199-200 (1998) (detailing
Judge Stanton Wettick's typical experience on Fridays where he generally received at least one
order, in response to a plaintiffs request for pre-complaint discovery, seeking a stay of discovery
"until the pleadings are closed." Judge Wettick generally granted these orders on the basis that the
"discovery rules should be applied in a manner consistent with these pleadings rules that are based
on the premise that discovery will be narrowed if the contours of the dispute are initially defined
through fact pleading"); see also Speicher v. Toshok, 63 Pa. D. & C.4th 435, 438 (2003) ("[A]
plaintiff seeking to depose parties or witnesses before filing a complaint is usually faced with a
motion for a protective order requesting that such discovery be barred until the filing of the com-
plaint. In most instances, the motion is granted.").
201. McNeil, 894 A.2d at 1274.
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plaintiff has a valid cause of action, but lacks a necessary fact to support
a complaint under the Pennsylvania fact pleading standard.2 °2 Moreover,
evidence suggests that a more lax standard may invite numerous prob-
lems, and may be subject to abuse without careful focusing and supervi-
sion by a judge.2 °3
2. Connecticut
Like Pennsylvania, Connecticut employs pleadings for the purpose
of developing the material facts at the beginning of litigation. 204 Accord-
ing to a state law treatise, "The Federal practitioner relies on discovery to
develop the material facts in respect of the cause of action, whereas the
Connecticut lawyer expects to find these facts in the pleading and may
compel the pleading of material facts. 205 As a fact pleading jurisdiction,
"[i]n Connecticut issue is joined on the pleadings, with important conse-
quences for discovery and issues of relevancy at trial. 20 6 Therefore, in-
terrogatories and requests for production "are not intended to serve as
devices for discovery of those material facts which a Connecticut pleader
must allege at the outset."
20 7
Connecticut allows a similar process for pre-suit discovery under
which parties are authorized to file a bill of discovery, defined by Con-
necticut courts as "an independent action in equity for discovery ... de-
signed to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the one in which
discovery is sought., 20 8 The requesting party "must demonstrate that
what he seeks to discover is material and necessary for proof of, or is
needed to aid in proof of or in defense of, another action already brought
or about to be brought.'' 209 A party can, therefore, file a bill of discovery
to obtain discovery for evidence to use in a subsequent action.
Like Pennsylvania, Connecticut uses a probable cause standard un-
der which parties attempting to obtain discovery must demonstrate good
faith and "by detailed facts" that probable cause exists to bring a poten-
tial cause of action.210 In this context, "[p]robable cause is the knowledge
of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has
202. See, e.g., Potts, 37 Pa. D & C.4th at 199 (noting that pre-complaint discovery may be
granted when a plaintiff seeks a copy of the "written employment agreement with the defendant" or
requests "medical records [from] a medical provider").
203. See Hoffman, supra note 126, at 242-44 (discussing the impact of TEX. R. CIv. P. 737
(repealed 1998)).
204. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-91 (West 2009) (requiring "a statement of the facts consti-
tuting the cause of action").
205. 1-10 Dupont on Conn. Civil Practice (MB) § 10-1.2 (2009).
206. 1-13 id. § 13-2.1.
207. Id.
208. Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994).




reasonable grounds for presenting an action.",21' The facts provided by
the plaintiff must "fairly indicate that he has some potential cause of ac-
,,212tion, The party must also show that the information sought is both
material and necessary and must further be able to describe the material
"with such details as may be reasonably available. 2 t3 Connecticut courts
have expressly stated that a plaintiff "should not be allowed to indulge a
hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which




Missouri's pleading rule requires that pleadings contain "a short and
plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief., 2 1 5 A proposal was made in 1943 that would have adopted the notic-
ing pleading standard of the Federal Rules; however, the fact pleading
standard survived and occupies a primary role in the state's courts. Ac-
cording to the Missouri Supreme Court, "The goal of fact pleading is the
quick, efficient, and fair resolution of disputes" by identifying, narrow-
ing, and defining the issues "so that the trial court and the parties know
what issues are to be tried, what discovery is necessary, and what evi-
dence may be admitted at trial. 21 6 In ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v.
Mid-America Marine Supply Corp.,217 the court clearly distinguished the
role of pleadings in the Missouri state system from that in the Federal
Rules, stating:
Where the federal courts now use discovery to identify the triable is-
sues, such has always been the role of the pleadings in Missouri.
Where the federal courts now use discovery to identify the facts upon
which the plaintiff's claim rests, such has always been the role of
pleadings in Missouri.
218
The Missouri Supreme Court has taken a slightly different approach
in situations where a party does not have access to the information neces-
sary to frame the pleadings, pointing out that the rules allow parties to
plead on "the best of the [party's] knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.,, 2 9 Further-
211. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cosgrove Dev. Co. v. Cafferty, 427 A.2d
841, 842 (Conn. 1980)).
212. Id.
213. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pottetti v. Clifford, 150 A.2d 207, 213
(Conn. 1959)).
214. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pottetti, 150 A.2d at
213).
215. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.05.
216. State ex rel. Harvey v. Wells, 955 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Mo. 1997).
217. 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1993).
218. Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
219. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03(c); see also Wells, 955 S.W.2d at 548.
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more, a Rule 55.27(d) motion for more definite statement allows the trial
court, in its discretion, to allow a party whose pleading has been chal-
lenged more time to discover facts that will enable the party to support
the claims in the pleading. The Missouri Supreme Court has held, how-
ever, that in exercising this discretion trial courts are directed to be "sen-
sitive to the reasons that Missouri remains a fact pleading state" and to
ensure that "[u]nnecessary expense should be eliminated by requiring
parties, as early as possible, to abandon claims or defenses that have no
basis in fact.
220
Fact-based pleading has met with considerable satisfaction in many
states, due in part to the ability of such pleadings to narrow issues and
focus claims early. Given the apparently successful method of assuring
both initial court access and long-term access in the civil justice system,
further exploration of a fact-based pleading approach at the federal level
is warranted.
III. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH
A. A Proposed New Pleading Standard
The time is right to consider narrowing the issues at the pleading
stage in federal court. In Iqbal and Twombly, the Supreme Court clearly
fretted over a system that leaves issue narrowing to the discovery phase
or later.221 Attorneys mostly agree with this sentiment. In a 2008 survey
of the Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, over sixty-four
percent of respondents indicated that fact pleading can narrow the scope
of discovery.2 Similarly, in a 2009 survey of the American Bar Asso-
ciation Section of Litigation, just under sixty-five percent of respondents
who self-identified as representing both plaintiffs and defendants indi-
cated the same belief.22 3 And in a 2009 case-based survey of attorneys
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, a plurality of respondents who
self-identified as representing roughly equal numbers of plaintiffs and
defendants agreed that disputed issues would be identified earlier with
fact pleading.224 It is time to discard the old structure of waiting to focus
issues until the discovery phase of litigation, and install in its place a new
system in which meaningful access to the courts is guaranteed both at the
outset of a case and throughout its lifetime.
Pleadings that require the recitation of facts directly bearing on the
elements of a claim or affirmative defense will better address current
problems of pervasive cost and delay by commencing the issue-
narrowing process at the start of the case. It bears repeating that embrac-
220. Wells, 955 S.W.2d at 548.
221. See supra Part I.A.
222. ACTIIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-3.
223. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 37, at 52 & tbl.4.3.
224. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 38, at 49 fig.24.
[Vol. 87:2
REIN VIGORA TING PLEADINGS
ing fact-based pleading does not mean a return to code or common law
pleading, or a rejection of the basic structure of the Federal Rules. Dis-
covery, judicial management, and summary judgment would still be
available to further focus the parties as the case moved along. Indeed, far
from replacing these tools, development of facts at the pleading stage
would enhance their use and allow cases to move toward meaningful
resolution more effectively.
1. Improvements for Discovery
Discovery is most effective when the parties are able to think com-
prehensively about the evidence necessary to prove their claims or de-
fenses from a very early stage in the litigation. Early identification of the
specific issues in dispute allows a party to craft a discovery plan to un-
cover specific, relevant evidence in the most efficient manner possible.
Early issue-narrowing through fact-based pleading also makes discovery
gamesmanship less likely. Under a notice pleading regime, it is more
difficult to ascertain whether a disproportionate discovery request was
motivated by an innocent effort to collect all the relevant facts or a more
sinister desire to drive up the costs of responding and force a settlement.
This blurred line renders impotent most rules that would otherwise con-
trol abusive discovery. Rule 37 and Rule 26(g) sanctions are rarely is-
sued, in part because determining malicious intent is so difficult.225 Rule
26(b) proportionality determinations are necessarily ad hoc and difficult
to predict because judges must navigate and balance a thicket of mostly
unquantifiable factors 226-- and because even the most earnest judges
know less about the facts of the case than do the parties.227 A requirement
to plead facts from the outset would remove many of the "innocent"
excuses associated with excessive discovery, and would make truly mali-
cious efforts to overuse discovery easier to spot and sanction.
2. Improvements for Judicial Management
Effective judicial management of a case depends on the judge hav-
ing sufficient understanding of the relevant facts and issues. While the
judge cannot be expected to know everything that the parties and their
counsel know, neither can the judge afford to be ignorant of case specif-
ics. The introduction of facts at the pleading stage will help the judge
identify the specific issues in dispute, which in turn will increase the
judge's ability to make comprehensive and informed decisions about the
scope of discovery and pretrial practice.
225. See Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level
Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 645 n.404 (2002).
226. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (basing proportionality determinations on a considera-
tion of "the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues").
227. See Bone, supra note 67, at 1990.
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3. Improvements for Summary Judgment
The well-known standard for a grant of summary judgment is that
"the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits [must] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
' 28
Too often, however, summary judgment motions become an exercise in
competing affidavits and lengthy document appendices. Fact-based
pleading can help streamline the summary judgment process in two
ways. First, by focusing discovery and making the process leading up to
summary judgment faster and more cost effective, fact-based pleading
makes the actual filing of a summary judgment motion more economical-
ly palatable. Second, where facts are pled and admitted, the parties and
the court can simply rely on the pleadings to establish the presence of a
fact, obviating the need for affidavits or documentary proof. The result
should be faster and more streamlined summary judgment rulings.
4. The New Standard
After more than seventy years, is it hard to remember that pleadings
were once the primary vehicle for narrowing disputed issues in federal
civil actions. The move to notice pleading in the federal system in 1938
was a break from this centuries-old tradition-a noble experiment that
unfortunately has proven to have too many negative side effects. Discov-
ery, judicial management, and summary judgment may well be useful
tools for narrowing issues, but in too many civil cases they cannot
achieve that goal on their own. Narrowing issues through the pleading of
material facts is the traditional, effective, and all-too-often overlooked
solution.
Accordingly, we propose the following new standard:
9 A party must plead material facts sufficient to support each ele-
ment of an asserted claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or affirmative de-
fense. A material fact would be defined as a fact that is essential to the
claim or defense and without which it could not be supported.
e In answering a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, any statement
of fact that is not specifically denied would be deemed admitted. General
denials would not be permitted, and any denials based on lack of infor-
mation of knowledge would have to be so pleaded.
* If a responding party determines that a claim or affirmative de-
fense lacks sufficient facts to support each element, the preferred re-
sponse would be a motion for a more definite statement. The court would
be instructed to grant liberally the ability to amend a claim or defense to
insert sufficient material facts to support each claim.
228. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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9 If a claiming party could not provide at least one material fact for
every element of the claim, dismissal of the claim would be proper.
* The claiming party would be free to plead more than one material
fact for a claim element if such facts were known. Unlike the more rigid
pleading requirements of the common law or the codes, there would be
no punishment for incidental pleadings of evidentiary facts or conclu-
sions of law-although conclusions of law would of course be ignored
for purposes of determining whether the claim or defense satisfied the
pleading standard. Similarly, a "fact" that was objectively fanciful could
not serve to support a claim on a motion to dismiss.
This proposed pleading standard would also narrow the scope of
discovery, consistent with the reintroduction of the issue-narrowing role
to the pleading stage. Rather than deeming discoverable "any nonprivi-
leged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense," 229 as the
rule currently allows, we propose limiting discovery to non-privileged
matter that is directly relevant to developing, proving, or disproving dis-
puted material facts as established by the pleadings. Accordingly, if a
material fact is admitted in the pleadings (either directly or by failure to
set forth a specific denial), discovery related to that fact would be unne-
cessary and therefore precluded. For those material facts that are in dis-
pute, however, discovery would still be permitted both with respect to
the material facts actually asserted, and the so-called "evidentiary facts"
that help establish material facts. In other words, the proposed scope of
discovery standard is designed to focus discovery on those issues that are
especially germane to the facts and issues still in dispute, but maintain
parties' ability to explore those facts with a certain degree of latitude.
Our proposed fact-based pleading regime would also include an out-
let for pre-suit discovery to collect relevant material facts that lie exclu-
sively in the possession of another. It would be recommended to courts
to permit such discovery-after notice and an opportunity to be heard by
a potential opposing party-upon a showing by the petitioning party that:
(1) the petitioner cannot prepare a legally sufficient complaint without
the information sought; (2) the petitioner has probable cause to believe
that the information sought will enable preparation of a legally sufficient
complaint; (3) the petitioner has probable cause to believe that the infor-
mation sought is in the possession of the person or entity from whom it is
sought; (4) the proposed discovery is narrowly tailored to minimize ex-
pense and inconvenience; and (5) the petitioner's need for the discovery
outweighs the burden and expense to other persons and entities.230
229. Id. 26(b)(1).
230. This proposed approach to pre-suit discovery has been codified in pilot rules developed by
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System and the American College of Trial
Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and Civil Justice. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE,
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This pre-suit discovery rule is designed to balance the need for
access to the discovery process with the acknowledged burdens that dis-
covery imposes. The party from whom pre-suit discovery is sought
would have the opportunity to be heard before any ruling was issued,23'
and the court would have the power to impose limitations and conditions
on the scope of pre-suit discovery consistent with the petitioner's demon-
strated needs.
B. The Proposed Standard in Practice: An Example
To better illustrate how the proposed new standard would work in
connection with the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we ex-
amine a typical claim for patent infringement. We choose a patent case
simply because it provides a relatively clean and concise illustration. The
same principles would apply to a wide range of civil cases, both
straightforward and complex.
The elements of an infringement claim are clearly established in
Title 35 of the U.S. Code: "Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any pa-
tented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, in-
fringes the patent. 2 32 Civil Form 18 sets out the minimally sufficient
patent infringement complaint under the current system, which requires
only four paragraphs after the jurisdictional statement: (1) a statement
that the plaintiff owns the patent; (2) a statement that defendant has been
infringing the patent "by making, selling, and using" the device embody-
ing the patent; (3) a statement that the plaintiff has given the defendant
notice of its infringement; and (4) a demand for an injunction and dam-
233ages.
The most notable thing about Form 18 is how little must actually be
stated in the complaint. Parties tend to take advantage of the loose re-
quirement. As one court has pointed out, "[c]omplaints and counter-
claims in most patent cases are worded in a bare-bones fashion. 23 4 But
the ultimate success or failure of a claim for patent infringement must
turn on specific facts-facts that require time, energy, and money to un-
cover during the discovery phase. Some facts are indeed complex and
more appropriate for discovery. But many other facts are simply stated
and fundamental to the case-facts such as the identities of the paten-
21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM-PILOT PROJECT RULES, at PPR
3.1 (2009).
231. For a discussion of the importance of an express notice requirement for pre-suit discovery,
see Hoffman, supra note 126, at 270.
232. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
233. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18; see also McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
234. N.D. ILL. LOCAL PATENT R. preamble.
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tee(s) and assignee(s); patent number; dates of application and issue;
efforts to mark products or processes covered by the patent; the specific
products allegedly made, sold or used in violation of the patent; and the
patent claims that are allegedly infringed. Stating such facts at the plead-
ing stage either takes them off the table for discovery (because they are
admitted) or focuses the discovery on information relevant to the remain-
ing disputed facts and issues.
Facts such as these should be readily available to a party asserting
patent infringement. Indeed, the local patent rules of several federal dis-
trict courts presume that such information has been collected and consi-
dered before a case ever commences. The new Local Patent Rules of the
Northern District of Illinois, for example, require a plaintiff alleging in-
fringement to disclose within fourteen days after an answer is filed all
documents pertaining to the disclosure, sale, transfer or embodiment of
the claimed invention; the conception and development of the claimed
invention; communications with the Patent and Trademark Office con-
cerning each patent in suit; and ownership of patent rights by the assert-
ing party.235 Similarly, the Northern District of California requires dis-
closure of asserted claims and infringement contentions within ten days
after an initial case management conference. 6
We do not suggest that infringement contentions and claim charts
be included in the initial pleadings. Because the background investiga-
tion has presumably taken place by the time of filing, however, surely a
claimant could recite facts in the complaint concerning the claims of the
patent that are allegedly infringed, as well as identify all known allegedly
infringing products. Likewise, a party alleging patent invalidity as an
affirmative defense should be expected to identify in the initial pleadings
the factual basis for the alleged invalidity. A defendant alleging obvious-
ness,237 for example, would be expected to provide material facts to show
that the asserted invention was a combination of known elements that
would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant
art238-including identification of the known prior art upon which defen-
dant will rely for its defense.
Even this brief example suggests that bringing facts to light at the
pleading stage is feasible and can promote cost-effective litigation. In-
formation that is essential to the narrowing and resolution of the in-
fringement dispute would be presented at an early stage, obviating the
need for additional discovery requests, costly depositions, or even a sepa-
rate round of automatic disclosures. To the extent there is ensuing dis-
235. See id. 2.1(a).
236. N.D. CAL. PATENT LOCAL R. 3-1.
237. To receive a valid patent, a claimed invention must not have been obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the relevant art. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
238. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
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covery, motion practice, or judicial involvement in managing the case,
these tools would already be informed by a better understanding of the
issues in play.
CONCLUSION
Charles Clark's vision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
driven by two fundamental principles: that all cases should be decided on
their merits rather than on procedural maneuverings, and that "a basic
goal in litigation should be economy of time and resources. '239 Sadly,
after more than seventy years of experience under the Federal Rules, we
appear to be further away from achieving those principles than ever be-
fore. The potential cost of discovery and motion practice may force
plaintiffs with meritorious claims to settle because they cannot afford to
vindicate their rights, and likewise may force defendants who are not at
fault to settle because doing so is less expensive than slogging through
the broad discovery and motion practice process.
The Federal Rules are littered with efforts to compensate for the
loss of efficiency and cost effectiveness that are so ably handled by the
introduction of facts at the pleading stage. The controversial sanctions
permitted by Rules 11 and 37, the judicial management provisions of
Rule 16, the labyrinthine proportionality provisions of Rule 26, the pre-
sumptive discovery limits of Rules 30 and 33, the electronically stored
information provisions of Rules 26, 34 and 45, and the summary judg-
ment procedures of Rule 56 all represent attempts to focus parties on the
real issues in dispute. Many of these rules would still be beneficial in a
system in which fact-based pleading focused the issues from the outset.
If anything, they would be more effective, the equivalent of chisels to
hone already focused issues rather than sledgehammers trying to give
even basic shape to the controversy.
Opposition to fact-based pleading appears to stem primarily from
two concerns: fears that meritorious claims will not get into court, and
worries that the burden of marshaling facts at the outset of the case will
outweigh the issue-narrowing benefits.240 As we have tried to demon-
strate, neither concern is insurmountable. Properly used, fact-based
pleading should open the courthouse door to meritorious claims, because
claimants will be able to see their rights through to vindication and in-
crease the chances for full compensation of damages through a formal
239. Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 351, 357 (1987).
240. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 38, at 50 fig.25 (finding that sixty percent of self-
identified plaintiff attorneys responding to the survey indicated agreement or strong agreement with
the statement, "Even if raising the pleading standards would help to identify and frame disputed
issues at an earlier stage in litigation, the added burdens for plaintiffs would outweigh any benefits,"
and about fifty-eight percent of self-represented defendant attorneys disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the statement).
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judicial process. And from an objective viewpoint, the cost of a pre-filing
investigation to pull together salient facts should be far less than the al-
ternative costs of discovery and motion practice under the current Feder-
al Rules.
There is work to be done in this area. Nearly all attorneys practicing
in the United States District Courts today have known only notice plead-
ing, and most have spent the entirety of their professional lives in a post-
1970 system where discovery is the dominant aspect of civil litigation.24'
Resistance to change is therefore understandable, even as large percen-
tages of the active bar grumble about costs to their clients, discovery
abuse, and diminishing trial rates. But there is too much dissatisfaction
with the current system-both from within and from outside the legal
profession-to be complacent. Changes to the rules, and to attitudes
about what the rules should be designed to accomplish, have become
necessary. Restoring the issue-narrowing function to the pleading stage
would be a good start.
241. According to a 2000 census of lawyers practicing in the United States, the most recent
available, seventy-five percent of then-practicing attorneys were born after 1946, meaning they
likely did not enter practice until at least 1970. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Lawyer Demographics (2009),
http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/LawyerDemographics.pdf. In the ensuing
ten years, the number of still-practicing lawyers whose experience predates either the Federal Rules
or the 1970 discovery amendments has only become smaller.
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